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Abstract
Collaborative environments, such as Wikipedia, often have low barriers-to-entry in order to encourage
participation. This accessibility is frequently abused (e.g., vandalism and spam). However, certain
inappropriate behaviors are more threatening than others. In this work, we study contributions which are
not simply ``undone'' -- but *deleted* from revision histories and public view. Such treatment is generally
reserved for edits which: (1) present a legal liability to the host (e.g., copyright issues, defamation), or (2)
present privacy threats to individuals (i.e., contact information).
Herein, we analyze one year of Wikipedia's public deletion log and use brute-force strategies to learn
about privately handled redactions. This permits insight about the prevalence of deletion, the reasons that
induce it, and the extent of end-user exposure to dangerous content. While Wikipedia's approach is
generally quite reactive, we find that copyright issues prove most problematic of those behaviors studied.
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ABSTRACT

Wikipedia, user generated content, collaboration, redaction,
content removal, copyright, information security.

in the past year [4]. Inevitably, such services publish some
inappropriate content: low barriers-to-entry invite poor contributions, while massive volume prevents thorough vetting.
Indeed, it has been estimated that 7% of Wikipedia edits
are unconstructive in nature (i.e., vandalism) [15].
While abusive contributions may slowly erode the reputation of a service, this research concerns itself with only
the most severe cases: content which is actually dangerous
to the host-site or real-world individuals. Wikipedia, our
basis for analysis, is no stranger to such threats. The encyclopedia has been threatened with litigation for copyright
issues [14], accused of hosting child pornography [18], and
briefly blacklisted in some regions for similar reasons [11].
In an attempt to mitigate these threats, Wikipedia deletes
offending revisions from public view. We analyze one year’s
worth of public deletion logs to reason about the quantity
and reasoning behind such actions. Moreover, by archiving
Wikipedia revisions, we are able to recover deleted content
and discover redactions handled in a more private fashion.
We find deletion is not uncommon, with some 55,000 edits
being redacted/suppressed in 2010. However, the tool was
broadly enabled only recently, and thus is being used to handle a backlog of old incidents. While this skews broad trends,
focus on recent events reveals a rather reactive system. Most
incidents are “undone” within minutes and deleted within
several hours. Copyright issues, however, prove harder to
identify. Strategies to detect such cases and address the consequences of a declining Wikipedia labor force [13] remain
future challenges in this domain.

1.

2. RELATED WORK

Collaborative environments, such as Wikipedia, often have
low barriers-to-entry in order to encourage participation.
This accessibility is frequently abused (e.g., vandalism and
spam). However, certain inappropriate behaviors are more
threatening than others. In this work, we study contributions which are not simply “undone” – but deleted from revision histories and public view. Such treatment is generally
reserved for edits which: (1) present a legal liability to the
host (e.g., copyright issues, defamation), or (2) present privacy threats to individuals (i.e., contact information).
Herein, we analyze one year of Wikipedia’s public deletion
log and use brute-force strategies to learn about privately
handled redactions. This permits insight about the prevalence of deletion, the reasons that induce it, and the extent of
end-user exposure to dangerous content. While Wikipedia’s
approach is generally quite reactive, we find that copyright
issues prove most problematic of those behaviors studied.

Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.5.3 [Group and Organization Interfaces]: collaborative computing, computer-supported cooperative work ;
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection

Keywords

INTRODUCTION

User-generated content (UGC) and collaborative functionality is becoming increasingly prevalent in Web applications.
The open-access models used in such systems enable the accumulation of content/knowledge at rates not possible in
more traditional settings. For example, the video-sharing
site YouTube has over 65,000 daily uploads [10], while the
collaborative encyclopedia Wikipedia [3] had 45 million edits
∗This work supported in part by ONR MURI N00014-07-1-0907.

Given the short time for which revision deletion has been
enabled on English Wikipedia (see Sec. 3), our work is the
first to examine the process. Nonetheless, these are issues
which other UGC applications have confronted. Whereas
Wikipedia relies on a volunteer labor-force to find dangerous content, commercially-driven sites often outsource the
review process [16]. In their analysis of YouTube, Cha et al.
found that 0.4% of videos are deleted, but only 5% of these
are due to copyright violations. In contrast, our analysis
concentrates on text, not multimedia content (per Sec. 4.2).
More specific to Wikipedia is the work of Gehres et al. [12]
which proposes a multi-level security wiki. Gehres’ system is
proactive in delegating roles/rights, while Wikipedia’s deletion system limits read-access in an ex post facto manner.
Meanwhile, Edwards [11] examines deletion/censorship on
UGC websites, finding it a practical requirement to avoid
blacklisting and regulatory troubles. Our motivation to pursue this topic was [17] and the notion that deletion could
hide security events from public/researcher view.

ID
RD1
RD2
RD3
RD4
RD5
RD6

DESCRIPTION
Blatant copyright violations
Grossly insulting/offensive
Purely disruptive material
Revision pending suppression
Other valid deletion
Non-contentious housekeeping

Table 1: Redaction criteria [8]

3.

CHANGES
Visibility increased
Visibility decreased
No visibility changes
Orthogonal changes
TOTAL

Figure 1: Page history w/redaction

DELETION ON WIKIPEDIA

Revision deletion (sometimes called selective deletion or
redaction) on Wikipedia is enabled by a software feature
called RevDelete [8]. Revision deletion removes individual
edits from an article’s history and is a distinct mechanism
from standard deletion where whole entities are removed
(articles, files, etc.). Standard deletions happen for both
benign (e.g., non-notable article topics) and malignant reasons (e.g., pornography). However, for reasons described in
Sec. 4.2, this work concentrates solely on revision deletions.
RevDelete was enabled for the ≈ 40 users with the oversight right in Jan. 2009. In May 2010, usage was extended
to the ≈ 1800 users with admin privileges1 .
For each revision being handled, any combination of three
fields can be redacted: (1) the content, those modifications
made to the article (often visualized as a diff), (2) the
username of the editor who made the change, and/or (3) the
summary where the editor describes his/her modifications.
Fig. 1 shows an example page history with a redacted edit.
The acceptable “criteria for redaction” are shown in Tab. 1
and covered in greater depth at [8]. It should be noted that
“typical” vandalism and attacks do not merit deletion. Generally, one of these criteria is cited in the publicly-viewable
deletion log. Users with admin/oversight rights can audit
the actions of others, as they can see the deleted fields.
RevDelete also enables a stronger form of deletion called
suppression or oversight 2 . It is identical to the weaker form
except that: (1) it can only be performed by oversight
users, (2) affected edits can only be viewed by oversight
users, and (3) it is not publicly logged. Reasons for employing suppression are described at [7] and pertain primarily to
defamation and privacy issues.

4. DATA COLLECTION
4.1 Public Logs
The public deletion log is accessible via the MediaWiki
API [1]. Fields of interest include: (1) the revision-id (RID)
of the affected edit, (2) a log-id, (3) log timestamp, (4) a
comment field to explain the deletion, (5) a bit-field describing “old” visibility settings, and (6) a bit-field for new visibility settings. Similarly, the API can be used to gain information about affected revisions (those portions not redacted).
We processed this log from Jan. 2010 through Jan. 2011,
storing information about roughly 50,000 redaction actions.
Occasionally, the visibility of a single edit’s fields are changed
multiple times in the twelve-month history. As Tab. 2 shows,
RevDelete users tend to show a conservative bias, initially
1
If an “ordinary” user discovers dangerous content, permissioned users can be notified using off-wiki channels.
2
To avoid ambiguity, we treat the two forms in a disjoint
fashion. The terms deletion and redaction will refer exclusively to the weaker (but more common) form, while suppression will describe stronger uses of the tool.

#
563
188
40
25
816

%
69%
23%
5%
3%
100%

Table 2: Visibility changes

censoring more fields then eventually deemed necessary. We
remove “preliminary” actions from our dataset, considering
only “final” assignments. Further, rows where the final state
is complete visibility (i.e., “undeleted”) are discarded. These
two changes leave 49,161 unique revisions/rows for analysis.

4.2 Archiving Content
The public deletion log provides no data on two relevant
fronts: (1) the actual content redacted, and (2) usage of
the suppression function. However, by fully archiving all
Wikipedia revisions immediately after they are committed,
we can learn more about both aspects. If one has archived
data for a RID which later appears in a deletion log, then one
has its redacted fields. Similarly, if one has archived data for
a RID, but a subsequent request indicates redaction, then
the RID has been suppressed (if there is no public log entry).
The wholesale collection of Wikipedia data presents ethical and legal issues. For example, one could acquire childpornography – the possession of which is illegal. This motivates our decision to archive only text content. Of course,
text content may also have legal implications (a motivating
factor of this research). Our institution’s legal counsel has
advised that our research is protected because it is a consumer of such content, not a distributor thereof. This work
reproduces no deleted/suppressed content.
To archive content, we used a combination of “Recent
Changes” IRC channels and the Wikipedia API [1]. For
each edit to the main article namespace we store the RID
and the three fields eligible for reaction (content, username,
and summary). This was done for Aug. 2010, archiving approximately 4 million edits3 . To find suppressed edits, we
re-queried the API for all RIDs in our archive several months
later, noting those revisions with redacted fields.

5. DATA ANALYSIS
5.1 Incident Groupings
In the previous section, we identified 49,161 revisions affected by redaction. However, “revision-level” analysis is not
ideal. Imagine revision rn introduces dangerous content.
Subsequent revisions rn+1 . . . rn+x may be constructive, but
fail to remove the threat. When the dangerous content is
discovered, all edits back to rn will need to be redacted, because the threat persists through them. Thus, rn+1 onward
are essentially “collateral damage” of the earlier offense and
underscore why “incident-level” analysis is more intuitive.
Where possible, we present incident-based statistics.
In our data, incidents are identified when multiple RIDs
share a log-id (as well as log timestamp/comment) and are
therefore the result of a single RevDelete action. For our
3
Additional data collection was forgone given the significant
bandwidth costs to both our own servers and those operated
by Wikipedia. Further, we seek only a glimpse into this
“private” data given our more complete public sets.

MO
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
Jun.
Jul.
Aug.
Sep.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
SUM

RD1
2
3
25
1
17
37
88
167
129
252
1087
338
2146

RD2
11
23
31
17
697
913
718
840
1846
5067
535
323
11021

RD3
0
10
3
5
1006
427
1695
103
161
179
112
152
3853

RD4+
1
2
1
0
2
37
6
51
18
19
14
84
235

OTH
9
4
27
18
97
101
158
313
193
165
215
352
1652

SUM
23
42
87
41
1819
1515
2665
1474
2347
5682
1963
1249
18907

Table 3: Deletion incidents (month × rationale)
49k revisions we identify 18,907 incidents. While 89% of
incidents have just one revision, copyright-related incidents
(identified per Sec. 5.4) have an average of 12.5 revisions.
This is intuitive: copyright incidents are less obvious than
other violations and are thus more likely to go unnoticed.

5.2 Redaction Prevalence
The “sum” column of Tab. 3 shows the quantity of incidents flagged per month. Clearly, the decision to enable
RevDelete for admins (a 50× increase in the user-base) in
May 2010 had a profound effect. It would appear these additional users benefit Wikipedia’s well-being.
Pinpointing the prevalence of dangerous revisions among
the complete set of edits is difficult. Roughly 45 million edits were made to English Wikipedia in 2010 [4], and that
same year saw ≈ 19k incidents redacted. It should be emphasized that only 7,978 (42%) of the incidents flagged in
2010 actually occurred in that year. It remains to be seen
if this is a side-effect of the tools infancy (with a backlog
of incidents being cleared4 , now that a mechanism exists to
redact them) or if some dangerous content is successful in
evading detection for such durations (see Sec. 5.5).
Of course, these figures represent only dangerous content
that is caught. It is difficult to quantify threats that are:
(1) live on the site, or (2) still accessible in page histories.
Available data does allow us to state that at least 0.05% of
revisions made in 2010 contained dangerous content. While
not overwhelming – a single incident could amount to legal
action (or a privacy leak) under the right circumstances.

5.3 Fields Affected
Tab. 4 shows the frequency of redaction for each of the
three eligible fields. In brief, content is deleted in 75% of incidents and the summary in 25% of cases. Username redactions are quite rare5 . These results are unsurprising: article
content is the foundation of Wikipedia and thus also the
field most often in need of deletion.

5.4 Reasons for Redaction
Recall from Tab. 1 the six criteria for redaction. Tab. 3
shows the prevalence of each reason when grouped by incident. Mapping an incident to its criteria is straightforward,
given that RevDelete users conventionally cite reasons in
their block-log comments (which we assume trustworthy).
Vague/generalized criteria descriptions [8] and standardized log entries, however, do not intuitively tell of the de
4

A log of long-term abuse to Wikipedia is maintained at [5].
Proactive patrolling of the “user creation log” may locate
offensive usernames before they can edit.
5

REDACTED
content
summary
user
summary + content
user + content
user + summary
all fields
TOTAL

NUM
13616
4082
832
151
51
14
161
18907

%
72.0%
21.6%
0.8%
4.4%
0.3%
0.1%
0.8%
100.0%

Table 4: Redacted fields for incidents

facto thresholds for redaction. By examining deleted content
(per our archival), we attempt to provide informal insight.
Our inspection found offensive content (RD2) revisions
were almost all directed at an explicit human individual.
Unsourced claims about these persons commonly involved
sexual innuendo, claims of promiscuity or pedophilia, and
racial slurs – usually carried out in profane language. Acts
of disruption (RD3) were found to be remarkably similar,
also including more “appropriately written” falsities, solicitations, and massive insertions of random content.
Copyright violations (RD1) are common6 , yet straightforward. Such cases are not harmful on the surface, but in their
method of content acquisition. Criteria RD4, RD5, and RD6
are rarely cited and given no further attention7 . The “OTH”
(other) column of Tab. 3 aggregates log-comments not citing
a particular issue. In general, this set contains a diverse set
of the previous criteria (see also footnote 7).

5.5 Redaction Response Times
One way to measure the impact of dangerous content is
the detection interval, the time duration between an incident’s beginning and eventual redaction. Fig. 2 visualizes
these intervals, indicating a median detection period of over
13,000 hours – or about 1.5 years. Clearly, as discussed in
Sec. 5.2, this speaks to the handling of a backlog of threats
prior to the time RevDelete was broadly enabled. Looking
only at incidents occurring after May 2010, results are more
encouraging. Analysis shows a median interval of 2 hours
for all incidents, yet 21.6 days for copyright-specific ones.
However, this does not indicate if fresh “old” incidents are
still being discovered. To this end, Fig. 3 shows detection
intervals based on the month of flagging. We would expect
to see any “backlog” being handled just after RevDelete was
widely enabled (May) and detection times improving with
continued usage. Results for [Nov. – Dec.] are a vast improvement over the Fig. 2 average, but [Sep. – Oct.] showed
the slowest detections of any interval studied. Future analysis is needed to determine the convergence of this trend.
In addition to the detection interval, we can measure a
critical subset of that period, an incident’s active duration.
The former is the time redacted edits are accessible via revision histories. The latter is the period when the damage was
in a default-visible version (i.e., that most-recent). All users
can make an edit inactive by simply editing the article. Impressively, Fig. 4 reveals a median active duration of about
two minutes for all incidents, but 21 days for copyright infringements (nearly identical to their detection interval).
6
Tab. 3 may underestimate RD1 prevalence. In a Sep. 2010
incident, 25,000 suspected copyright infringements were
found [6], but the matter was not resolved using RevDelete.
7
In fact, no incidents cite RD4 (revision pending oversight/suppression). Such labeling is likely avoided, as it
would invite attention to edits that admins should not view.
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Figure 2: Detection intervals
MO
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
Jun.

#SP
536
770
445
356
446
221

#RD
40
78
144
76
2803
3137

MO
Jul.
Aug.
Sep.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
SUM

40
Dur. ALL
Dur. RD1
Views ALL
Views RD1

0
0.1

1
10
100 1000 10000
hours until deletion (logscale)

Figure 3: Detect-time by flag month
#SP
658
287
338
557
492
487
5593

60

20

0
1

#RD
4134
4739
6077
9946
13509
5790
50473

Table 5: Num. suppressions (SP) & redactions (RD)

5.6 End-user Exposure
Combining the survival times of the last section with pageview statistics, we can better measure the exposure of dangerous content (i.e., the number of visitors who see it).
To this end, we collected hourly, per-article view statistics [2] for the entirety of 2010. Assuming uniform intra-hour
hit distributions, one can produce a view-estimate for any
incident’s active duration. Fig. 4 shows the CDF of active
view counts (only for incidents active in 2010). The median
case receives ≈ 1.25 views, suggesting that unpopular pages
are frequent targets and/or threatening content on popular
articles is dealt with very quickly. Unsurprisingly, copyright
incidents fared more poorly with a median of 36 views.
Broadly, view statistics can be aggregated to show that
there were roughly 5.9 million views of dangerous revisions
in 2010 (or 11 views per-minute). From this perspective,
Wikipedia seems to be winning the content battle. Given
that the English version served 85 billion pages in 2010 [4],
just 0.007% contained content that has since been redacted.

5.7 Suppression
To this point, our analysis has concentrated on the simple form of redaction, not the stronger suppression available
only to oversight users. As Tab. 5 shows, this lack of focus
is warranted given that suppression actions occur an orderof-magnitude less frequently than redaction ones8 .
Our brute-force archival and re-querying was successful
in identifying 100+ suppressed edits. Unable to view the
private logs, we cannot establish incident groupings or detection intervals (though they could be lengthy, given the
very small number of oversight users).
However, we can determine the fields that get suppressed.
We find content removal to be most common, followed by
usernames. Summary suppression is exceedingly rare in our
small sample. Finally, manual inspection of revisions shows
that the publication of individual’s addresses and phone
numbers is the most common reason for suppression.
8
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Suppression counts were obtained from [9]. That source
counts actions, so our presentation of redaction quantity
does the same (i.e., includes “undeletes” and changes).
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Figure 4: Active dur./views

6. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we processed one year’s worth of English
Wikipedia’s public deletion logs and used archival strategies
to both recover redacted content and discover privately suppressed revisions. We found that RevDelete was used to
handle nearly 55,000 redactions/suppressions in 2010, most
often hiding content exhibiting the characteristics of libel,
copyright infringement, and privacy violations.
We also found that the tool, only recently being widely
enabled, is being used to eliminate a backlog of old incidents.
Focus on recent incidents indicates a reactive system. For
instance, dangerous content is usually inactive within two
minutes, with formal deletion within two hours. We found
that 0.007% of page views in 2010 resulted in exposure to
threatening content. Many such views were the result of
copyright issues – the most problematic of behaviors studied.
Detecting these copyright issues and preventing dangerous content altogether both appear worthwhile areas for research. Such progress could reduce the liability of UGC
hosts and improve perceptions of the collaborative paradigm.
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